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'Quality Attestation' and the Risk of the False Positive
Abstract
The Quality Attestation Presidential Task Force’s recent proposal for “quality attestation” (QA) of clinical
ethics consultants was advanced on the premise that, “[g]iven the importance of clinical ethics
consultation, the people doing it should be asked to show that they do it well.” To this end, the task force
attempted to develop “a standardized system for proactively assessing the knowledge, skills, and practice
of clinical ethicists.” But can this proposed method deliver? If the proposed QA process is flawed, it will
label clinical ethicists as qualified to do clinical ethics consultations (CECs) when they are not. The result
will be the creation of a new, likely intractable, problem of CEC “false positives:” consultants who have
passed QA without actually possessing the requisite knowledge and skills to perform CECs.
To avoid the risk of false positives, the QAPTF needs to conduct a rigorous analysis of the skills that the
QA process will be positioned to judge and those that are simply beyond the scope of its current metrics.
Rather than “attesting” to overall CEC “quality,” QA needs to be precise about the skill inventory it can
confirm yet honest about the skills it has no basis to assess. I will argue here that QA has strong
prospects for accurately assessing consultants’ competence in ethical analysis but very weak prospects
for determining competence in two other skills listed as essential by the QAPTF: value-neutrality and
conflict resolution.
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‘Quality Attestation’ and the Risk of the False Positive

The recent proposal for “quality attestation” (QA) of clinical ethics consultants was
advanced on the premise that, “[g]iven the importance of clinical ethics consultation, the people
doing it should be asked to show that they do it well.”1 To this end, the Quality Attestation
Presidential Task Force (QAPTF) attempted to develop “a standardized system for proactively
assessing the knowledge, skills, and practice of clinical ethicists.”2 But can this proposed
method of QA deliver on the promise of a discriminating assessment of clinical ethics
consultants? Assessing the assessment method before the program launches is of paramount
importance because, if the proposed QA process is flawed, it will have the adverse effect of
labeling clinical ethicists as qualified to do clinical ethics consultations (CECs) when they are
not. The result will be the creation of a new, likely intractable, problem of CEC “false
positives:” consultants who have passed QA without actually possessing the requisite knowledge
and skills to perform CEC. Coming from the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities
(ASBH) – the national bioethics organization – the QA imprimatur will be seen as having
effectively weeded out the incompetent and untrained. Therefore, false positives in QA would do
more harm than good by replacing the prevalent uncertainty about the quality of consultants with
a specious confidence and reassurance about their qualifications.
To avoid the risk of false-positives, the QAPTF needs to conduct a rigorous analysis of
the skills that the QA process will be positioned to judge and those that are simply beyond the
scope of its current metrics. Rather than “attesting” to overall CEC “quality,” QA needs to be
precise about the skill-inventory it can confirm, while being upfront about the skills it has no
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basis to assess. In the service of beginning that review, I will argue here that QA has strong
prospects for accurately assessing consultants’ competence in ethical analysis, but very weak
prospects for determining competence in two other skills listed as essential by the QAPTF: 1)
value-neutrality: i.e., “avoid[ing] the risk of imposing…values and judgments;”3 and 2) conflict
resolution: i.e., “facilitating, and, when appropriate, mediating solutions.”4 If I am correct, the
examples stand as evidence that the QAPTF needs to be more restrained and explicit about
which qualifications QA can verify.

An Inconsistent Litany of CEC Skills
The first obstacle to a systematic evaluation of what the proposed QA will cover is the
moving target in the QAPTF document of what they take the necessary CEC skill set to be.
While the QA process is designed to “identify individuals who are qualified to perform this
role,”5 the QAPTF conception of the CEC role appears to vary at different points throughout
manuscript – often in substance, but certainly in emphasis. For example, they make a passing
reference to the 1998 ASBH Core Competencies for Health Care Ethics Consultation, stating:
“That document forms the basis of the assessment process envisioned by the quality attestation
process,”6 but they offer no catalogue of the core competencies their QA process will measure.
At three separate points in the document,7 they lay out various criteria for good CEC, but these
three sets of skills don’t entirely overlap.
As a first example: early in the document the QAPTF says of consultants, “They must be
trained to avoid the risk of imposing their values and judgments,” harkening back to the Core
3
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Competencies’ admonition, “Ethics consultants need to be sensitive to their personal moral
values and should take care not to impose their own values on other parties.”8 While the concern
about value imposition undergirds the Core Competencies’ central distinction between the
“authoritarian approach” they deride and the “ethics facilitation approach” they embrace, this
neutrality criterion does not appear in the QAPTF’s next two lists of benchmark skills.
One of the few proficiencies emphasized in all three lists is mediation, which,
interestingly, is relegated to the 11th – and last – skill mentioned in the Core Competencies’
“ethics facilitation approach”: “apply mediation or other conflict resolution techniques, if
relevant.”9 In the QA document, the authors first mention this skill in their overview of CEC:
“In order to perform their activities, clinical ethics consultants have access to families and the
medical record, and they are often called upon to mediate conflict and provide assistance at times
of great stress and emotional need.”10 In their second and third lists of skills and attributes, they
write, respectively: “Clinical ethics consultants must ‘be trained to engage in…explaining,
facilitating, and when appropriate, mediating solutions”11 and, then, “examiners reviewing the
portfolio will be able to distinguish whether the candidate followed established guidelines for
CEC:…using reason, facilitation, negotiation, or mediation to seek a common judgment about a
plan of care moving forward…”12
Throughout the QA document, the QAPTF names a hodge-podge of other CEC skills
they may intend to scrutinize and evaluate, but at no point do they chart with any precision or
transparency the exact set of skills that are to be appraised. Without such a skills-rubric, it is
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impossible to judge how many false positives there will be given the proposed assessment
model. While they painstakingly describe the elements of the two-step evaluation – the portfolio
and oral exam – they have not yet provided an equally meticulous articulation of both the skills
under review and the corresponding metrics for testing each of them.
Below I offer a cursory look at the prospects for making meaningful judgments about
three skills named in the QA report: ethical analysis, value neutrality, and conflict resolution.
While I am optimistic about the probability that the proposed QA will be able to evaluate the
first, I am skeptical about the likelihood of avoiding false positives with regard to the latter two.

Ethical Analysis
With the significant number of clinical ethics case discussions woven into the QA
process, assessing the candidate’s ability to do ethical analysis should be a fairly straightforward
task. The required portfolio includes 6 lengthy cases analyses and an additional 6 others that are
more briefly dissected and summarized. If candidates pass this first step, an oral exam will be
given that will ask candidates to perform extemporaneous case-analysis, demonstrating that they
can “think on their feet”13 about the ethical dimensions and considerations involved in cases.
The chosen modes of assessment (i.e., the portfolio and oral exam) can hardly fail to
highlight the candidate’s proficiency in ethical analysis because the genres selected deliver
precisely that type of data. Borrowing an insight from Tod Chambers’ The Fiction of
Bioethics,14 both the case write-up and its oral correlate are constructs that lend themselves to
sleuthing out competence in principle-detection. Chambers writes, “[T]he genre of the medical
ethics case has adopted distinct narrative attributes – distinct ways of portraying characters,
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plotting events, presenting scenes – which determine the kind of questions that can be raised as
relevant…”15 Cases are “constructed to provide a particular moral viewpoint,”16 and that
framework is principlist. If “ethical analysis” is defined – as it typically is in the field of
bioethics – as applying a principle-based template to an ethical conflict, then the QA process will
surely determine competence in this activity. The genre is built for this type of scrutiny, i.e., for
detecting the pertinent ethical considerations from the set of bioethical concepts and principles
commonly employed in bioethical discourse.
Of course, as Chambers convincingly argued, the moral reasoning and moral
argumentation that candidates will be able to demonstrate in these genres will be largely
“principlist” in nature (rather than, say, virtue ethics or feminist ethics of care). Evaluators will
not be able to assess casuistical skill, at least not what I think of as “moral archeology,”17 that
mines cases for novel perspectives, weakly articulated moral claims, or nascent principles. What
evaluators will be able to see is the candidate’s application of standard, well-established
principles and concepts that comprise the field’s dominant “principlist paradigm.”18

Value Neutrality
If candidates’ ability to do conventional ethical analysis will be readily apparent in the
proposed QA process, their ability to avoid the authoritarian imposition of their values on
stakeholders will be much more difficult to detect. To think otherwise is to underestimate the
insidious nature of values-bias.
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The assumption that seems to underlie both the QA document and the Core
Competencies is that reflective adults are cognizant of their explicit and implicit normative
biases and have them well in hand. The view seems to be that merely being mindful and
attentive to the issue of values-bias is all that is needed to avoid inserting one’s own particular
moral views of right and wrong or good and bad into the consultation process. Therefore, in the
QA process, candidates will simply need to note those instances when they were vigilant about
moral or religious difference in the CECs they have conducted. The authors write, “Candidates,
knowing that they will be preparing their work for the assessment, will offer individual best
practice,”19 presumably highlighting the ways in which they remained neutral in various
consultations. But this view of bias and value-partiality is strikingly naïve.20
The core problem is our difficulty in perceiving our own values and biases, explicit or
implicit. We do not routinely conduct a “values-inventory” of our central beliefs, what John
Rawls famously called our personal “conception of the good.”21 And even fewer of us have
diagnosed our implicit biases.22 Consider moral bias as an example: when I impose my
normative or religious values on someone else, I actually perceive myself as articulating what is
morally or spiritually right, not expressing one particular view of a situation that legitimately
admits of possibly many other morally supportable views.23 Values-imposition masquerades as
moral righteousness and objectivity. With the exception of the familiar bioethical differences
19
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standardly taken to be part of legitimate American pluralism – e.g., views on abortion, religious
objections to blood products, etc. – most clinical ethics disputes involve deeply held beliefs that
seem objectively and universally true to the beholder. Our moral certitude blinds us to how our
own core convictions drive the CEC agenda, steer the conversation, and find their way into the
recommendations we make. Maintaining value-neutrality against the backdrop of an extreme
plurality of values in the contemporary U.S. – on axes as far-ranging as class, education,
ethnicity, race, gender, religion, etc. – requires more than simple mindfulness.
The QA process significantly underestimates the difficulty of the task of identifying and
relaying moral and religious bias. Evidenced by the single prompt: “How do you recognize and
handle your personal beliefs and biases when conducting CEC with others who may or may not
share those beliefs?,”24 the QA portfolio treats the matter as a straightforward question that will
generate accurate and serviceable data needed to assess competency in this area. There are
compelling reasons to worry that the QA process will fail to detect CEC values-bias.

Conflict Resolution Skills
If distilling CEC-bias through the medium of self-authored case write-ups will be a
daunting – maybe even hopeless – task, then using this same means to assess candidates’ skills in
mediation and conflict resolution is downright baffling. Mediation is a practical skill and can
only be assessed in practice. A candidate’s self-reflection on his or her ability to mediate
conflicts may be a helpful exercise in the teaching of mediation, but it is meaningless as a way of
evaluating mediation. It’s pure “hearsay,” parallel to replacing third-party judges in a sporting
event with an athlete’s own self-assessment. Reflecting on one’s own performance can, again,
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be a useful learning experience – one often employed in mediation training – but it has no place
in a process intended to verify competence and mastery.
Consider the various elements of mediation and conflict resolution that candidates are
supposed to display in CECs, according to the QA proposal: “elicits the positions and interests
of the agents and actors,” “acknowledges all stakeholders in choosing among available options,”
“reaching consensus,” “amplifying the voices of the patients and family,” and “explaining,
facilitating, and, when appropriate, mediating solutions.”25 The candidate is not a reliable
witness about whether s/he performs these tasks well. Only the stakeholders in the conflict can
attest to whether: their positions and interests were well understood; a resolution reached that
was truly consensual and not coercive; their voices heard and, if needed, amplified; the situation
suitably explained; the conversation neutrally facilitated; and the broiling conflicts de-escalated
and mediated to a resolution shared by all parties.
For the QA process to include an assessment of mediation and conflict resolution is to
bite off more than they can chew and runs the most serious risk of generating a false positive
with regard to an important skill set needed in CEC.

Conclusion
In an arena of high-stakes practice that currently has no regulation and oversight, the
proposed QA has the potential to do substantial good in establishing minimum competence for
those who perform clinical ethics consults. But at this early stage, it is imperative that the QA
process not claim to establish more than the proposed metrics can assess, or it will risk deeming
consultants qualified in competencies they may not possess. In reviewing the full laundry list of
possible CEC skills and knowledge, the QAPTF confidently claims, “In sum, examiners
25
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reviewing the portfolio will be able to distinguish whether the candidate followed established
guidelines for CEC.”26 This confidence may be warranted with regard to some of the essential
elements of CEC, but, as I have tried to show, not in regard to as many as they claim. As an
important step in the evolution of CEC credentialing, the QA process needs a rigorous evaluation
of what its metrics will be able to verify and more measured claims about what it can actually
attest.
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